Biography[ edit ] Tetlock was born in in Toronto, Canada and completed his undergraduate work at the University of British Columbia and doctoral work at Yale University , obtaining his PhD in Work[ edit ] He has published over articles in peer-reviewed journals and has edited or written ten books. How Can We Know? The forecasters were experts from a variety of fields, including government officials, professors, journalists, and others, with many opinions, from Marxists to free-marketeers.
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Biography[ edit ] Tetlock was born in in Toronto, Canada and completed his undergraduate work at the University of British Columbia and doctoral work at Yale University , obtaining his PhD in Work[ edit ] He has published over articles in peer-reviewed journals and has edited or written ten books.
How Can We Know? The forecasters were experts from a variety of fields, including government officials, professors, journalists, and others, with many opinions, from Marxists to free-marketeers. The tournaments solicited roughly 28, predictions about the future and found the forecasters were often only slightly more accurate than chance, and usually worse than basic extrapolation algorithms, especially on longer—range forecasts three to five years out.
Forecasters with the biggest news media profiles were also especially bad. This work suggests that there is a perverse inverse relationship between fame and accuracy.
As a result of this work, he received the University of Louisville Grawemeyer Award for Ideas Improving World Order, as well as the Woodrow Wilson Award for best book published on government, politics, or international affairs and the Robert E. Lane Award for best book in political psychology, both from the American Political Science Association in These findings were reported widely in the media and came to the attention of Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity IARPA inside the United States intelligence community—a fact that was partly responsible for the launch of a four-year geopolitical forecasting tournament that engaged tens of thousands of forecasters and drew over one million forecasts across roughly questions of relevance to U.
Illustrative questions include "What is the chance that a member will withdraw from the European Union by a target date? It involves gathering evidence from a variety of sources, thinking probabilistically, working in teams, keeping score, and being willing to admit error and change course. The Superforecasting book focused on shorter-range forecasts, the longest of which, about 12 months, being only as long as the shortest forecasts in the Expert Political Judgment project.
Tetlock and Gardner also suggest that the public accountability of participants in the later IARPA tournament boosted performance. Apparently, "even the most opinionated hedgehogs become more circumspect"  when they feel their accuracy will soon be compared to that of ideological rivals. They argue that tournaments are ways of signaling that an organization is committed to playing a pure accuracy game — and generating probability estimates that are as accurate as possible and not tilting estimates to avoid the most recent "mistake".
When, for instance, do liberals and conservatives diverge in the preferences for "process accountability" that holds people responsible for respecting rules versus "outcome accountability" that holds people accountable for bottom-line results? This research argues that most people recoil from the specter of relativism: the notion that the deepest moral-political values are arbitrary inventions of mere mortals desperately trying to infuse moral meaning into an otherwise meaningless universe.
People can become very punitive "intuitive prosecutors" when they feel sacred values have been seriously violated, going well beyond the range of socially acceptable forms of punishment when given chances to do so covertly. He argues that most political psychologists tacitly assume that, relative to political science, psychology is the more basic discipline in their hybrid field. Although he too occasionally adopts this reductionist view of political psychology in his work, he has also raised the contrarian possibility in numerous articles and chapters that reductionism sometimes runs in reverse—and that psychological research is often driven by ideological agenda of which the psychologists often seem to be only partly conscious.
Tetlock has advanced variants of this argument in articles on the links between cognitive styles and ideology the fine line between rigid and principled   as well as on the challenges of assessing value-charged concepts like symbolic racism  and unconscious bias is it possible to be a "Bayesian bigot"?
The spotlight here is on a fundamental question in political theory: who should get what from whom, when, how, and why? In real-world debates over distributive justice, however, Tetlock argues it is virtually impossible to disentangle the factual assumptions that people are making about human beings from the value judgments people are making about end-state goals, such as equality and efficiency.
Tedlock, July 19, Education: University of California , Berkeley, B. Hobbies and other interests: Skiing, running, swimming, dance, videoing. Associate editor, Journal of Anthropological Research, ; senior editor, Dreaming, ; associate editor, Latin American Research Review, ; editor-in-chief, American Anthropologist,
Philip E. Tetlock