DONNELLAN REFERENCE AND DEFINITE DESCRIPTIONS PDF

Kazrahn The ambulance came and took me to the hospital where I had to wait an hour for the doctor to see me. Essays in Honor of Michael DummettOxford: The Varieties of ReferenceOxford: Since indefinites with the relevant scopal properties would violate standard syntactic constraints, indefinites must in some cases be semantically referential. Russell saw that scope relations are relevant here. Disagreement, Implicit Arguments, and Relative Truth.

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Vunris Fara argued donnellah the same strategy can be extended to generics as well. This is not surprising, given that pragmatics can involve sophisticated real world reasoning. The ddscriptions, of course, is to hold that the stressed definite determiner is indicating descripgions or salience. As noted in the beginning of this article, the Russellian account of descriptions not only offers a quantificational as opposed to a referential account of descriptions, but it packs three different claims into the analysis of descriptions: Of course, as Kadmon stressed, pronouns typically do ajd to introduce uniqueness, as an example like 25 shows.

Thus, 4a captures the fact that the negation has wide scope in a manner that can be glossed thus: Academic Tools How to cite this entry. From the Publisher via CrossRef no proxy jstor. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts donnellan keywords for each book and chapter. On the standard Russellian analysis, we get something like a claim that John wants that there be a unique ghost in his attic and that it stop making so much noise.

Kripke responded to Donnellan by arguing that the Russellian account of definite descriptions could, by itself, account for both referential and attributive uses; the difference between the two cases could be entirely a matter of pragmatics.

For example, begining with Strawson and the work cited above, we have numerous writers arguing that the existence claim is presupposed. Donnellan, Reference and definite descriptions — PhilPapers This disjunction is in their minds in the sense that they can deliver the answer for each possible world when it is described in sufficient detail, but it is implicit in the sense that the pattern that brings the various disjuncts together as part of the, possibly highly complex, disjunction may be one they cannot state.

In section VII, he denies that it is any sort of ambiguity, either syntatic e. Philosophical Review 75 3: For Kripkeand Devitt this sort of approach was hopelessly circular. Boiled down to its simplest non-technical form, the idea is that an expression of the form in 3 is shorthand for the conjunction of three claims:. Nor, of course, could a referential use be associated with wide scope, as Kripke argued forcefully—they simply are not the same phenomenon.

Consider 30from Ludlow and Neale and 31 from Kripke. Ordinarily, when philosophers talk about descriptions, they have two kinds of expressions in mind: This free variable might then be picked up by some sort of discourse operator as discussed in the previous section. Abbott and Horn have suggested that the use of stress in descriptions highlights the uniqueness implications of the utterance.

Find it on Scholar. Von Fintel and Yablo offer an explanation for these minimal pairs that draws upon the nature of belief revision. What descriptiobs also intriguing about this line of inquiry is that it suggests a new strategy for accounting for definiteness. The problem is that the Fodor and Sag arguments do not address the pragmatic account of referential uses, which of course was the alternative advanced by Kripke.

Before discussing this distinction in use, I will mention some features of these theories to which it is especially relevant. As Rothchild observes, a similar argument can be made for descriptions embedded in questions here assuming, as did Russell, that possessives are to be analyzed as definite descriptions: But see Brogaard and Bach dlnnellan defenses of maximality. The idea is the following: This describes the DRT strategy only in the most general of terms, but we can already see that the questions that plague the Russellian story have their reflex here as well.

Enhanced bibliography for this entry at PhilPaperswith links to its database. Reference and Definite Descriptions — Oxford Scholarship Aristotle could have decided it was immoral to take the position, or Phillip of Macedonia could have decided that Aristotle was not the best tutor for his young Alexander.

The present king of France is sitting in a chair.

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DONNELLAN REFERENCE AND DEFINITE DESCRIPTIONS PDF

Proper names[ edit ] By , analytic philosophers widely accepted a view regarding the reference-relation that holds of proper names and that which they name, known as descriptivism and attributed to Bertrand Russell. Descriptivism holds that ordinary proper names e. Written in response to the work of Bertrand Russell and P. Strawson in the area of definite descriptions , the essay develops a distinction between the "referential use" and the "attributive use" of a definite description.

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